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ANNE MENZEL
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS, AND UNCERTAIN 
“DEVELOPMENT“ IN SIERRA LEONE
IMPACTS, CONFLICTS, AND SECURITY CONCERNS 1
ABSTRACT
Sierra Leone recently attracted significant inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in export-oriented mi-
ning and agribusiness. These investments have usually involved large-scale land deals with local communities
that have been facilitated and brokered by government officials, local politicians, and paramount chiefs. Affec-
ted people and communities were supposed to receive compensations for lost land and, in addition, they expec-
ted to find gainful employment opportunities with multinational companies. But they have often seen little of the
FDI-driven development that they had expected and that had been promised to them. Based on available stu-
dies and my own field research, this paper will describe and discuss impacts, conflicts, and security concerns
related to foreign investment in mining and agribusiness in Sierra Leone. Through these descriptions and dis-
cussions I hope to offer a disconcerting perspective into the uncertainties and ambiguities of FDI-driven deve-
lopment in Sierra Leone ‒ a “development” that has often brought no tangible betterment for affected people
and communities but rather confirmed and even escalated experiences of marginalization and disappointment.
 
1 The writing of a first version of this working paper and parts of the empirical research were funded by International Alert and SOMO 
Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations. 
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ANNE MENZEL
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, LARGE-SCALE LAND 
DEALS, AND UNCERTAIN “DEVELOPMENT“ IN 
SIERRA LEONE
IMPACTS, CONFLICTS, AND SECURITY CONCERNS
“Yet for all the burdens we carry as a nation, we increasingly walk with a spring in our step. From mining to
infrastructure, agribusiness to renewable energy, tourism to fisheries, our economy has great potential. The
foundations have been laid; Sierra Leone is now ready for significant, high return investment. We are a people
of limited means but of unlimited ambition. It is time to join us in fulfilling that ambition. It is time to think
differently about Sierra Leone. It is time to visit our country and witness the opportunities it offers first hand.
And when you have seen what Sierra Leone has to offer, I believe you will share my conviction that...it  is
time...to invest...in Sierra Leone! Thank you.”
The President of Sierra Leone, His Excellency Ernest Bai Koroma, 
from a speech delivered at the 2009 Sierra Leone Trade and Investment Forum in London
(Koroma 2009). 
1. INTRODUCTION
The small West African country Sierra Leone, which
– before  the  current  Ebola  epidemic  –  used  to  be
most  widely  known  for  its  past  civil  war  violence
(1991-2002),  quite suddenly became one of  Africa’s
fastest growing economies in the early 2010s. Largely
due to the commencement of operations of two mul-
tinational iron ore companies in central and northern
Sierra  Leone,  real  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)
growth reached 15.2 percent in 2012 and is estimated
at  an  even  more  impressive  16.3  percent  for  2013
(Zayid 2014: 3). The 2014 African Economic Outlook
accordingly characterizes the recent growth spurt as
“iron ore led”, referring to export-oriented foreign in-
vestment  in  the  mining  sector:  “Prior  to  the  com-
mencement  of  iron-ore  mining  and  export,  growth
rates,  driven  by  increased  activities  in  agriculture,
construction,  manufacturing  and  services  sectors,
averaged 5.7% per annum” (Zayid 2014: 3). However,
agriculture  or, more precisely, export-oriented agri‒ -
business   also showed promise  in terms of  future‒
GDP growth: “The country has witnessed significant
private-sector  inflows  as  foreign  direct  investment
(FDI)  has  increased  three-fold  during  the  past  five
years” (Zayid 2014:  8);  and a significant portion of
these FDI inflows went into prospective agribusiness.
According to estimates by the NGO coalition Action
for Large-Scale Land Acquisition Transparency (AL-
LAT),2 at least 1,154,777 hectare, about 21.4 percent
of the country’s total arable land, were leased to for-
eign agribusiness investors in the short time period
between 2009 and 2012.  These agribusiness  leases,
which  do  not  even include  additional  leases  in  the
mining  sector,  usually  have  a  running  time  of  50
years with the possibility of extensions (ALLAT 2013:
14). 
A significant driver of foreign investment in export-
oriented  agribusiness  has  been  political  and
economic  enthusiasm  for  biofuels.  Globally,  small
Sierra Leone (with a population of roughly 6 million
and a  total  area  of 71.740  km2,  just  slightly  larger
than Ireland) recently became one of the most sought
after  locations  for  biofuel  investments  (see
2 ALLAT is a collation formed by a number of international, 
national, and local NGOs in Sierra Leone, such as Search for 
Common Ground (international), Campaign for Good Gover-
nance, Green Scenery (national), Malen Affected Landow-
ners’ Association, Partners Initiative for Conflict Transfor-
mation (local), and many more (see ALLAT 2013: 92).
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Nolte/Ostermeier/Schultze  2014:  4).3 The  most
prominent  agribusiness  investor  in  Sierra  Leone,
Addax  Bioenergy  (a  subsidiary  of  the Switzerland-
based Addax & Oryx Group),  started production in
May 2014 (see Addax Bioenergy 2014). In 2013, the
company’s investment in northern Sierra Leone was
approved  as  a  Clean  Development  Mechanism
(CDM)  project  of  the  United  Nations  Framework
Convention  on  Climate  Change.  It  is  the  first
sugarcane-based  power  generation  project  for
ethanol production to be registered as a CDM project
in Africa (see Addax Bioenergy 2013). The company,
which − in addition to its export targets − also stated
the  aim  of  generating  120  GWh  per  year  for  the
national grid in Sierra Leone (see Addax Bioenergy
2013),  has  also  received  praise  from  Sierra  Leone
President Ernest Bai Koroma (see Addax Bioenergy
2014);  and it  has been criticized by local,  national,
and international NGOs (see ALLAT 2013; ActionAid
2013).  Its  critics  have  pointed  out  that  the  Addax
investment has had significant  negative impacts  on
affected local  communities   even though Addax is‒
still considered a comparatively “good” investor, not
least  on  account  of  its  compensation  policy  for
landowners who lost access to their lands due to the
Addax investment: “In the absence of an official and
binding  national  crop  compensation  list,  Addax
Bioenergy should be credited for its transparency and
documentation  of  compensation  paid  to  affected
landowners,  and  for  having  developed  a  detailed
agricultural  asset  list.  This  states  compensation
values  for  59  different  crop  and  tree  types,  and
includes  values  for  farm  huts  and  fence  lines”
(ALLAT 2013: 40).
The  Addax  case  is  roughly  representative  of  the
uncertainties and ambiguities that have accompanied
recent FDI inflows in both mining and agribusiness.
International  donors,  investors,  the  Sierra  Leonean
Government, and also many upper and middle class
Sierra  Leoneans  (professionals,  business  people,
education  elites  etc.)  emphasize  the  development
prospects  associated  (or  assumed to  be  associated)
with FDI; but most Sierra Leoneans still struggle to
make  ends  meet  −  more  than  half  the  population
lives, or struggles to exist, below the national poverty
line.4 Recent  reports  by  local,  national,  and
international  NGOs5 have  drawn  attention  to
negative  impacts  of  large-scale  land  deals  with
3 The biofuel investment influx country ranking provided by 
Nolte, Ostermeier and Schulze (2014) is based on data gathe-
red by The Land Matrix, a global land monitoring initiative 
that promotes transparency and accountability in decisions 
over land and investment, see http://landmatrix.org/en/ (last 
accessed 09 January 2015).
multinational  companies  and,  in  response,  were
criticized  by  government  officials  for  allegedly
overstating  problems  and  spoiling  the  investment
climate (see e.g. Temple 2014; Koroma 2014). There
have  been suspicions  of  corruption  by  government
officials, local politicians, and traditional authorities
 most importantly paramount chiefs ‒ ‒6 involved in
facilitating land leases as well as alleged threats and
violations  against  labor  activists;  both  have usually
been impossible to prove or discard due to a lack of
hard evidence.7 Public protests have been condemned
by  government  officials  and,  in  some  instances
(mostly  pertaining  to  the  mining  sector),  were
violently dissolved by paramilitary state police forces
(see  e.g.  Medico  International  et  al.  2013;  Human
Rights Watch [HRW] 2014). 
A common argument that has been brought forth to
counter public discontent is that members of affected
communities  are  allegedly  having  “unrealistic”
expectations with regard to their rights and abilities
to benefit from FDI. For example, during a workshop
organized  by  the  government’s  Attitudinal  and
Behavioral  Change  Secretariat  in  August  2013,  the
Minister of Youth Affairs stressed that young people,
4  This is according to World Bank data and estimates (see 
World Bank 2014a). In Dollar-terms, more than 80 percent of
the population is estimated to live on less than US$2 per day 
(see World Bank 2014b). Life expectancy at birth is 45 years 
(see World Bank 2014c). As is usually the case, the numbers 
tend to vary across organizations, for slightly different num-
bers see, for example, the Sierra Leone country page of the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2014). 
5 See The Oakland Institute (2011), Welthungerhilfe (2012), 
Medico International et al. (2013), ActionAid (2013), AL-
LAT (2013), HRW (2014).
6 Although it is often regarded as a central element of Sierra 
Leonean “traditional” culture, not least by Sierra Leoneans 
themselves, the chieftancy system is, in large parts, a relict of 
British colonial indirect rule (see e.g. Fanthorpe 2001: 379-
384; Shaw 2002: 234-237). Recent local governance reforms 
in the context of post-war peacebuilding have not fundamen-
tally challenged chiefly authority. Rather, they have introdu-
ced an additional “layer” of governance institutions, local 
councils, which are part of the formal state governance struc-
ture. Paramount chiefs and their sub-chiefs are supposed to 
cooperate with, and fulfill tax-collection functions on behalf 
of local councils. In their respective chiefdoms ‒ the central 
administrative units within Sierra Leone’s districts (outside 
the capital city Freetown and the surrounding Western Area) 
‒ paramount chiefs and their sub-chiefs also administer cu-
stomary law in informal courts. Though their rulings are often
accused of being biased against lower-status people, these 
courts usually present the only kind of legal mechanism that 
most people have access to (see Jackson 2006; Sawyer 
2008). Paramount chiefs are also regarded as “custodians of 
the land” and, as such, exercise authority with regard to land 
allocation (see e.g. Unruh/Turray 2006). I will elaborate on 
this last point in section 3 of this paper. 
7 See e.g. ALLAT (2013: 14); Menzel (2013); Human Rights 
Watch (2014: 63-66).
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“should strive to empower themselves in order not to
be left  out of  the Agenda for Prosperity [the motto
and title  of  the current  Poverty  Reduction Strategy
Paper  for  Sierra  Leone,  which  states  the  aim  of
making  Sierra  Leone  a  middle  income  country  by
2035],  as  the  agenda has  no room for  people  with
negative  attitude  but  those  with  determination”
(Bangura 2013). In other words, Sierra Leoneans are
called  upon to  first  become ready for  development
before  they can receive  it.  During  field  research  in
Lunsar (a town in the immediate vicinity of  one of
the two growth-driving iron ore mines) in early 2014,
this  view  was  echoed  by  a  teacher  at  a  local
vocational training center. He complained that, “even
the women who sell at the market think that London
Mining  [the  multination  iron ore  company]  should
employ  them,  just  because  they  [London  Mining]
have come into this area. They don’t understand that
they  have  no  skills  that  might  be  valuable  for  the
company,  which  is  why  their  expectations  are  just
unrealistic”  (interview,  February  2014,  Lunsar).
However,  it  appears  that  people  were  often
persuaded  to  welcome  investors  and  give  up  their
lands,  only  because  they  expected  –  and  were
promised  −  gainful  employment  opportunities  in
return. With regard to large-scale land deals for both,
mining  and  agribusiness,  it  often  remains  unclear
whether  such  promises  were  actually  made  by
company representatives or by government officials,
politicians,  and  paramount  chiefs  involved  in
facilitating land deals (see e.g. ALLAT 2013: 43-44;
ActionAid 2013: 15; HRW 2014: 25). In this context,
framing  affected  people’s  expectations  as  being
“unrealistic”  is  nothing  short  of  cynical.  When  I
argued this point in the interview with the teacher in
Lunsar,  he  countered that  the  fact  that  people  had
“let  themselves  be  fooled  by  such  promises”  only
highlighted  the  need  for  adult  education  programs
like the ones (focusing on functional adult  literacy)
that  were  currently  being  co-sponsored  by  London
Mining as part of their corporate social responsibility
(interview, February 2014, Lunsar).8 
Based  on  available  studies  and  my  own  field
research,9 this  paper  will  describe  and  discuss
impacts,  conflicts,  and security  concerns  related  to
mining  and  agribusiness  FDI  and  large-scale  land
deals  in  Sierra  Leone.  I  begin by providing  a  brief
background on FDI-oriented development policies in
8 These adult education courses were being implemented as 
part of a pilot project collaboration between London Mining, 
the Sierra Leone government, and the German development 
agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit (GIZ 2013).
and  for  Sierra  Leone  and  then  arrange  my
descriptions and discussions along three focus areas:
land negotiations and community (un-)involvement,
gendered  livelihood  impacts,  and  conflicts  and
security concerns. What emerges, or what I hope will
become  “visible”  for  readers,  is  a  disconcerting
perspective into the uncertainties and ambiguities of
FDI-driven  development  in  Sierra  Leone  −  a
“development”  that  has  often  brought  no  tangible
betterment for affected people and communities but
rather  confirmed and even escalated experiences of
marginalization and disappointment.10
While  preparing  the  final  version  of  this  paper,  in
January 2015, it certainly feels like a strange time for
writing  about  impacts,  conflicts,  and  security
concerns related to FDI and large-scale land deals in
Sierra Leone. In light of the ongoing Ebola epidemic
the issues and concerns raised and discussed in this
paper  may  appear  extremely  secondary  –  if  not
outdated. But this is not the case. The politics of, and
disappointing  experiences  with  uncertain  and
ambiguous “development” inform the socio-political
context in which efforts to contain the epidemic are
currently taking place.  I will  return to this  point  in
the conclusion. 
2. BACKGROUND: RUNNING THE 
COUNTRY LIKE A BUSINESS
In late 2007, close to six years after the end of the
war,  Sierra  Leoneans  experienced  what  has  since
been  described  as  a  “watershed  moment”  (Kandeh
2008: 603) in the country’s peace process: Following
a rough and sporadically violent campaigning period
leading up to Sierra Leone’s second post-war general
elections in 2007 (see Christensen/Utas 2008),  the
electoral  process  nonetheless  culminated  in  a  non-
9 My first field research in Sierra Leone was in Bo Town and 
Bo District (southern Sierra Leone) from January until May 
2009. More recently, I conducted field research in Freetown, 
the Western Area, Kenema, Bo District and Kono District in 
September and October 2013, and in Freetown, Lunsar, Ke-
nema, Bo District and Kono District from January until 
March 2014. My first field research in 2009 was focused on 
post-war expectations of violence and readiness to resort to 
violence (for my PhD thesis, see Menzel 2015); the 2013 and
2014 research stays were related to consultancies and focused
on intergenerational and gender-related conflicts. However, I 
also found time to inquire about hopes, resentments, expecta-
tions, and experiences related to FDI and FDI-oriented deve-
lopment policies; and I extended the 2014 research stay 
beyond the consultancy contract period in order to spend 
time in the mining town Lunsar.
10 For theoretical perspectives on, and broader critical discussi-
ons of “development“ in the Global South, see e.g. Ferguson 
(1990; 2006), Escobar (1995), Duffield (2007), Wai (2007). 
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violent transfer of power from the ruling Sierra Leo-
ne People’s Party (SLPP) to the opposition All People’
Congress (APC) and its presidential candidate Ernest
Bai  Koroma.  The  newly  elected  government  soon
made it  clear − both at home and abroad − that  it
sought to lead the still desperately poor and long-suf-
fering people of Sierra Leone on a new and more pro-
mising path towards development: by making Sierra
Leone “open for business” and “running the country
like a business”. These slogans have since been repea-
ted in interviews, speeches, on billboards, and also in
a  promotion  video  addressing  potential  investors.
This video, which was produced by the Sierra Leone
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA)
and shown at the Sierra Leone Trade and Investment
Forum held in London in November 2009, blatantly
puts the country’s natural resources on offer: among
them  diamonds,  gold,  iron  ore,  beautiful  beaches,
“some of  the most  underfished territorial  waters  in
the world”, and fertile lands offering opportunities to
produce  “high  value  products  like  rice,  cocoa,  and
cashew” in addition to food crops like palm oil and
sugar,  which “offer  additional opportunities  as  bio-
fuels“ (SLIEPA 2009). The Forum was organized by
Tony Blair’s Africa Governance Initiative and atten-
ded and endorsed by influential individuals such as
Tony Bair himself, George Soros, and British banker
Lord  Dennis  Stevenson (see  Africa  Governance  In-
itiative 2009; Investment International 2009). SLIE-
PA has been receiving support from the World Bank
Group’s  International Finance Corporation,  the De-
partment for International Development (DFID), and
the European Union (see The Oakland Institute 2011:
13; ALLAT 2013: 14). 
This FDI-oriented approach presented a break with
the previous and, again, donor-supported vision for
development, which had been focused on developing
smallholder  agriculture  and  had  even  included  a
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan that
was formulated in 2003 but never implemented (see
ALLAT 2013: 17). After the 2007 elections, the focus
shifted to small holder commercialization aiming, “to
promote ‘farming as a business’ by focusing on value
chains  for  a  small  number  of  commodity  and cash
crops, on value adding and on increasing agricultural
production  through  intensification  and
mechanisation”  (ALLAT  2013:  13;  see  also
Comprehensive  Africa  Agricultural  Development
Program 2010).  With  the  support  of  major  donors
the  Sierra  Leone  government  has  since  promoted
smallholder  commercialization  as  an  adequate
bottom-up complement to FDI-driven development,
rather  than  family  farming  with  “hoe  and  cutlass”
(see The Oakland Institute 2011: 12). 
During  field  research  in  southern  Sierra  Leone  in
2009,  I  often  heard  people  refer  to  small  holder
commercialization as “tractorization”; they had heard
over the radio that farmers were supposed to receive
donor-funded  “help”  in  the  form  of  modern
machinery,  but  had  seen none  of  it.  When I  again
visited the same area in rural Bo District in 2013 and
2014,  even all  talk  of  “tractorization”  had vanished
(although  commercialization  programs  are  still
ongoing). Instead, the villages were buzzing with talk
about foreign investors who had come to see the local
paramount  chief  in order  to discuss  the terms of  a
land lease for a large rubber plantation. Though there
was  much  enthusiasm  for  the  investment  project,
many farmers also worried that they would not really
benefit  from the deal.  The paramount chief himself
was adamant that he would not allow the investors to
proceed unless  they guaranteed to  provide training
and education for local people  so that they would‒
be able to get “real” jobs with the company instead of
just  “suffering”  as  cheap  agricultural  laborers
(interviews  in  rural  Bo  District,  October  2013  and
February  2014).  He  was  aware  of  previous
“difficulties” with land deals and explained that there
had been a conference of paramount chiefs from all
parts of the country at which these issues had been
discussed.  He  was  also  in  contact  with  the  NGO
Welthungerhilfe  (aka  German  Agro  Action),  which
has a field office in Bo Town and has been seeking to
facilitate  the  formulation  of  district-level  binding
guidelines for dealing with investors  in cooperation‒
with Bo District Council and local paramount chiefs.
I have since learned from email correspondence with
Welthungerhilfe  staff  that  the  formulation
/negotiation  processes  are  ongoing  and  have  been
difficult, not least due to the opposition of some local
stakeholders  including  the  paramount  chief  I
interviewed.  During  our  interviews  and  conversa-
tions  I  certainly  had  the  impression  that  the
paramount  chief  felt  that  he  himself  (a  US-trained
economist)  would  be  best  suited  to  guarantee
mutually  beneficial  community-investor  relations
and  that  he  strongly  resented  any  kind  of  outside
“meddling”. He advised me that I should be careful
when  asking  critical  questions  about  FDI  in  Sierra
Leone,  because  the  government  authorities  were
tired of Western criticism that would only impede the
country’s  development  progress.  He  reminded  me
that  Western  countries  had  not  been  particularly
environment and human-rights conscious when they
themselves  developed  and  industrialized,  so  why
should it be any different in Sierra Leone? Why were
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Sierra  Leoneans  supposed  to  do  “everything  at
once”?  He  also  stressed  that  he  saw  no  viable
alternative  to  FDI-driven  development,  as  it  would
bring  much  needed  modernization.  Were  Sierra
Leoneans  supposed  to  work  with  their  hands  and
cutlasses for the rest of eternity? And how would they
be getting the technology and knowhow they needed
and  wanted  if  not  through  FDI?  Conventional
development  aid  had  certainly  not  provided  them
(interviews  in  rural  Bo  District,  October  2013  and
February 2014).
At  the  same  time   and  amidst  high  hopes‒   ‒ it
remains  far  from  certain  that  FDI  will  eventually
deliver  overall  net  development  benefits  to  most
Sierra  Leoneans. Several  reports  by  local,  national,
and  international  NGOs  have  drawn  attention  to
considerable  downsides  that  have  accompanied
recent FDI-inflows.11 These include complaints about
questionable working conditions provided by foreign
companies  and  about  mismanagement  and
corruption in the facilitation of large-scale land deals;
negative effects on health (especially in the form of
malnutrition)  and  on  education-affordability  in
affected  areas  where  farmers  have  lost  access  to
farmland and bush-resources (such as firewood etc.)
and face rising everyday living costs; and disruptions
in community social relations, for example, because
women and girls engage in sex-work catering to more
or  less  “local”  foreign  company workers,  who have
money  to  spend  and  who  are  quite  often  locally
unattached “strangers” (newcomers to the particular
locality).  There  have  been  clandestine  incidents  of
destruction and theft of company property as well as
sporadic  public  protests  in  immediately  affected
areas.  Such  protests  often  start  out  peacefully  but
turn  violent  with  the  intervention  of  armed  police
forces – who are often suspected to stand in the pay
of foreign companies (see e.g. Medico International
et al. 2013; HRW 2014: 46-58). In an interview with
HRW, Police Inspector General Francis Munu stated,
“that  there  are  informal  guidelines  for  how
companies can pay the police for specific functions,
but no national laws govern the payment of police by
private firms” (HRW 2014: 57).  In a conversation I
had  with  an  officer  of  the  Operational  Support
Division  (OSD),  a  paramilitary  police  force,  he
explained  in  more  detail  that  any  type  of  armed
private security was not welcome in Sierra Leone, as
it would “undermine the state”. If private persons or
companies required armed services, they would have
11 See e.g. The Oakland Institute (2011), Welthungerhilfe 
(2012), Medico International et al. (2013), ActionAid (2013),
ALLAT (2013), HRW (2014).
to  subcontract  OSD  personnel  (informal
conversation in Kenema, February 2014).  The clear
subtext was that the latter  type of arrangement did
not constitute an act undermining the state: because
private  business  and  the  investor-friendly
government are already on the same side. 
The  Sierra  Leone  government  has  indeed  firmly
condemned  protests  and  rejected  public  criticism
directed at investors’ business practices, the handling
of  large-scale  land  deals,  and  “police  brutality”,  as
many  Sierra  Leoneans  refer  to  recent  violent
incidents.  A  core  argument  against  protests  and
public  criticism  has  been that  they  run  the  risk  of
damaging  the  reputation  of  the  country  and  of  its
development-oriented  government  and,  in
consequence, have to be regarded as acts of sabotage
against  Sierra  Leone’s  development  prospects. The
harsh rejection of a HRW report (2014) focusing on
land  deals  with  African  Minerals  Limited  (the
company operating the growth-driving iron ore mine
in Bumbuna, Tonkolili District) and on police shots
fired at  protesters  in Bumbuna in 2012,  presents  a
case in point.  The Freetown based daily newspaper
Sierra Leone News Hunters quotes President Ernest
Bai Koroma rejecting the report and asserting that, 
“ ‘The people of Sierra Leone are wise enough now to
distinguish between development and backwardness,
and  nobody  would  be  fooled  to  believe  that  what
AML [African Minerals Limited] is doing is not in the
interest of the people,’ […] President Koroma stated
that the saboteurs are merely wasting their time, as
according to him, the AML is here to stay” (Koroma
2014: 3).12 
This  pattern of  grievances,  protest,  and rejection is
evident in all three focus areas to be discussed in the
following sections.  
3. LAND NEGOTIATIONS AND 
COMMUNITY (UN-)INVOLVEMENT
 
A common complaint voiced by communities affec-
ted by large-scale land deals pertains to their involve-
ment   ‒ or rather un-involvement   ‒ in land lease ne-
gotiation processes.  A particularly well documented
case is that of communities in Malen chiefdom, Puje-
hun  District,13 where  Welthungerhilfe  facilitated  a
“Project on Food Security and Rehabilitation of Rural
Infrastructure”  (funded by the German Federal  Mi-
12 For additional reading on the report and its rejection, see e.g. 
Temple (2014) and Peligal (2014).
13 For roughly similar cases ‒ regarding large-scale land deals 
for both, agribusiness and mining investments ‒ see ALLAT 
(2013), ActionAid (2013), and HRW (2014).
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nistry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
in close coordination with local  authorities and the
Sierra Leone Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry,  and
Food Security (MAFFS). The project started in Octo-
ber  2010.  In  May  2011,  however,  Welthungerhilfe
was  surprised to  learn that  the  area designated for
the  project  had  been  leased  to  Socfin  Agricultural
Company S.L. Limited (SAC, a subsidiary of the Bel-
gian  corporation  Socfin),  a  company planning  to
establish palm oil and eventually rubber plantations
in the project area (see Welthungerhilfe 2012: 9; AL-
LAT 2013: 23). Neither MAFFS nor local authorities
 ‒ the  District  Council  and local  paramount  chief  ‒
had informed Welthungerhilfe  about the company’s
investment plans and the  land deal that had already
been arranged. 
A  subsequent  research  undertaken  by  Welthunger-
hilfe  in  cooperation  with  the  Sierra  Leonean  NGO
Green  Scenery  showed  that  many  immediately
affected  local  farmers  had  not  been  aware  of  the
actual size of the lease-area for the SAC investment,
which turned out to be significantly larger than what
they  had  anticipated:  “The  people  affected  by  the
investment  had  understood  that  only  a  smaller
plantation, the former Sierra Leone Production and
Marketing Board (SLPMB) Plantation once managed
by the government,  would be leased to a company.
Only one village said they had clearly understood that
it was not just this plantation that would be affected.
The majority of villagers realized in a later meeting in
January/February 2011 that ‘all land will be taken’.
Some  people  even  said  that  only  during  a
‘Reconciliation  Meeting’  in  May  2011  […] had  it
become  clear  to  them  that  their  land  was  already
allocated to the company” (Welthungerhilfe 2012: 12;
original italics).
It appears that the Malen chiefdom paramount chief
had given his consent to the lease without adequately
informing,  let  alone  consulting  with  landowning
families and that the lease was signed in a context in
which  its  content  remained  obscure  to  many
signatories.  During  a  signing  ceremony  in  March
2011,  no  attempt  was  made  to  translate  the  lease
agreement  into  local  languages;  instead,  as  the
paramount  chief  himself  recounted  in  an interview
with  Welthungerhilfe,  the  agreement,  which  was
written  in  English  (which  is  not  widely  spoken  or
understood  in  Sierra  Leone,  especially  not  in  rural
Sierra  Leone,  even  though  it  is  the  official
language),14 was read out  aloud and thereby “made
public” (see Welthungerhilfe 2012: 15).   
Land rights in Sierra Leone are a complex affair, to
say the least. In Sierra Leone’s districts (the former
colonial  protectorate)   ‒ or,  put  differently,  in  all
areas  outside  of  the  capital  city  Freetown  and  the
Western  Area  (the  former  British  crown  colony)  ‒
land is “inalienable”,  that  is,  it  cannot be sold.  The
only option for foreigners seeking land is to lease it
from the relevant authorities. In theory, these are the
paramount chiefs with regard to so called community
land  and  the  (usually  male)  heads  of  landowning
families  with  regard  to  family  land  (see
Welthungerhilfe  2012:  7;  SLIEPA  2012:  4-10).  In
practice,  this  distinction  is  far  from  clear-cut.
Paramount  chiefs  are  often  regarded  as  a  more
general  “custodians  of  the  land”  and,  as  such,  also
exercise authority in the allocation of family land (see
Unruh/Turay 2006: 27). In the case of the SAC lease
it appears that land owning families were pressured
by  the  paramount  chief  and  by  the  government’s
resident  minister.  One  family  head  relayed  in  an
interview that, “I rejected the rent payment on behalf
of the Sellu family. The chief then told me ‘whether
or not you like it and whether or not you accept the
money,  the  company  will  come  and  work  on  your
land’  ”  (Welthungerhilfe  2012:  16).  By comparison,
the negotiation process that was going on during my
2013 and 2014 visits in rural Bo District (see section
2)  certainly  seemed  more  transparent,  though  I
suspect that it also involved some amount of nudging
and/or  the  application  of  more  or  less  gentle
pressure.  As  the  paramount  chief  and  one  of  his
section  chiefs  put  it  in  our  interviews  and
conversations, people did not always know how to act
in  their  own  best  interest.  Their  rationale  as
development-oriented  authorities  included  the
premise that their people would need to be guided for
the  sake  of  their  own  good  (interviews  and
conversations in rural Bo District, October 2013 and
February 2014). 
Back to Pujehun:  After the SAC lease was finalized
and  the  affected  families  had,  for  better  or  worse,
accepted it – without major protests and still hoping
that some benefits would come their way − there was
14 The Sierra Leonean lingua franca is Krio, an English-oriented
Kreol, which is widely spoken and understood throughout the
country. However, many people in rural areas are only fluent 
in the language(s) of their respective ethnic group(s). The 
two largest ethno-linguistic groups in Sierra Leone are Tem-
ne and Mende – the latter would have been the most appro-
priate language for conducting land negotiations in Pujehun 
District.
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much  disappointment  over  corporate  social
responsibility  projects  that  had  been  promised  but
did not match up to widely-shared expectations and
over the amount of yearly surface rent; the latter is
paid to the heads of landowning families in addition
to one-time compensation paid for lost plant-assets.15
According  to  ALLAT,  “SAC  pays  US$5  per  acre
(12.50  per  hectare)  a  year.16 That  amount  is
distributed according to the same formula developed
by MAFFS, with 50 per cent going to landowners, 20
per cent each to the district  councils  and chiefdom
councils, and the remaining 10 per cent going to the
national  government.17 This  distribution  has  been
criticized by civil  society groups,  which view it as a
possible  incentive for authorities  that  do not suffer
damage from land deals to support them. In order to
deal  with  the  resulting  tensions  a  ‘grievance
committee’  was  set  up”  (ALLAT  2013:  43).  Said
“grievance  committee”  was  set  up  as  part  of  SAC’s
corporate  social  responsibility  commitments  and is
chaired by Malen chiefdom’s paramount chief,  who
promptly  requested  that  US$25,000  of  funds
awarded to the committee be spent on a presidential
guest  lodge  in  the  chiefdom  headquarters;  the
request was approved by SAC (see ALLAT 2013: 47). 
Eventually,  in  September  2012,  there  were  some
sporadic  protests  when SAC began measuring  land
beyond the area of the initial plantation (see above)
and therefore beyond what most landowning families
had  been  willing  to  agree  to.  These  protests  were
treated as acts  of  sabotage and petty crime:   “Land
beyond the initial plantation area was to be measured
by SAC. The villagers of Basaleh area refused access
to  the  SAC  delegation.  SAC  returned  the  next  day
with the police; the villagers still refused access. As a
result,  four  people  were  arrested  and  the
15 There are no binding regulations for compensation payments.
There is only a list of recommendations provided by MAFFS:
“Only 30 kinds of crops/trees/rural resources are on the list 
and the very highest compensation rate is Le 200,000 
[US$46.35] for an orange tree or a half acre of upland rice. 
The lowest is Le 400 [US$0.09] for a single plant of local 
garden egg [eggplant, A.M.]. The compensation for an ‘eco-
nomic tree (timber)’ is, for example, Le 20,000 [US$4.60]. 
Compensation for an indigenous oil palm is Le 25,000 
[US$5.80] and for an improved variety is Le 40,000 
[US$9.27], not even close to the value of the oils that each 
type of tree produces in a single year” (ALLAT 2013: 40).
16 For comparison: According to findings reported by ALLAT, 
Addax Bioenergy pays US$8.89 per hectare per annum and 
Sierra Leone Agriculture (a subsidiary of the SIVA Group, 
an Indian conglomerate), which focuses on palm oil for etha-
nol production in Port Loko District, pays only US$2 per 
hectare (ALLAT 2013: 43).
17 A similar rent distribution scheme has also been implemented
in mining investment areas (see HRW 2014: 23).
measurements discontinued.  In another area where
SAC  tried  to  initiate  demarcation,  Banaleh,  the
villagers seized computers and other equipment from
the  SAC  delegation  and  reported  to  the  police  in
Pujehun.  SAC,  after  retrieving  the  equipment,
accused  the  villagers  of  having  damaged  it”
(Welthungerhilfe 2012: 15). 
It  can  safely  be  summarized  that  the  manner  in
which  large-scale  land  deals  are  negotiated  (or,
indeed,  settled  without  meaningful  community
involvement)  dependents  entirely  on  the  priorities,
intentions,  and characters of investors and national
and  local  authorities.  Although  SLIEPA  has  issued
guidelines  on  “best  practices”  for  investors’
interactions with local communities that insist on a
process  that,  “involves  the  careful  engagement  of
grassroots  stakeholders,  paying  particular  attention
to  the  role  of  landowners,  in  keep  with  customary
rules” (SLIEPA 2012: 10),18 these guidelines remain
vague and, moreover, unbinding. 
4. GENDERED LIVELIHOOD IMPACTS 
The advertisement  of  available  land for  foreign  in-
vestment in Sierra Leone is based on the assumption
and claim that  significant  portions  of  the  country’s
arable land are  presumably  unused (see SLIEPA‒ ‒
2009).  However,  much  of  this  presumably  unused
land is fallow land that needs to be left fallow in order
to restore fertility (see ALLAT 2013: 15). At the same
time, fallow lands still provide much needed nutritio-
nal  inputs  and  resources  for  local  communities:
“Fallow land is in fact not unused land but serves va-
rious purposes. If a field is no longer used for annual
crops, other useful plants like bananas are cultivated
and can be harvested in the transition to the fallow
phase. Fallow land also provides building materials,
firewood and medicinal  plants.  It  is  also a hunting
ground for bush meat, which contributes a conside-
rable portion of protein to the local diet” (Welthun-
gerhilfe 2012: 5). Fallow or not, the assumption that
leased-out land will not be missed is untenable. It has
already become clear that  those who lose access  to
land due to large-scale land deals face severe impacts
on their livelihoods.
For  one,  compensation  and  surface  rent  payments
offered as part of the lease agreements do not even
come  close  to  making  up  for  the  resources  and
livelihood-opportunities that have been lost.19 In an
18 Such “best practice” guidelines had already been issued in 
2010 (see e.g. Welthungerhilfe 2012: 8). 
19 See Welthungerhilfe (2012: 19-22), ALLAT (2013: 29-49), 
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interview with Welthungerhilfe one farmer reported
that, when he finally received his share of the annual
surface  rent  payment,  it  only  amounted  to  5.000
Leones – roughly one Euro per year (Welthungerhilfe
2012: 20).  Rent payments are made to the (usually
male)  heads  of  landowning  families,  who  then
distribute  them  according  to  their  own  patronage
priorities;  these tend to  discriminate against  junior
male members of the respective family  and against‒
women. Women are usually not granted “their  own
rights” with regard to family land.  Rather,  they are
given land by their husband or another male family
member, often in order to grow vegetables and fruits
for the family’s own use and for surpluses to be sold
at local markets. Without direct access to food stuffs
from  their  own  lands  (traditionally  women’s
vegetable gardens and men’s rice farms)20 and being
forced to purchase food on an everyday basis and at
rising  costs,  families  struggle  to  maintain  their
nutritional  standards  and  many  face  malnutrition
and  hunger.  Based  on  interviews  conducted  in
communities affected by the Addax, SAC, and Sierra
Leone Agriculture21 investments,  ALLAT found that
many families who had previously eaten three meals
per day had reduced their food intake to two or even
to  only  one  meal  per  day;  the  interviews  were
conducted  during  the  harvest  season,  which  had
previously  been  a  time  of  relative  abundance  (see
ALLAT 2013: 51). In addition, income from women’s
market sells is often used to pay for children’s school
materials  and  fees.  Although  primary  education  is
supposed to be free in Sierra Leone, parents usually
have  to  contribute  to  the  salaries  of  underpaid,
unpaid,  and,  according  to  widespread  complaints,
often  exploitative  teachers.  In  consequence,  many
affected areas have seen an increase in the number of
children  who  are  being  taken  out  of  school  (see
ALLAT 2013: 50; HRW 2014: 34-35). 
Secondly, a core promise associated with FDI-driven
development,  namely access to  gainful  employment
opportunities, has (so far?) not materialized  at least‒
not  for  many:  “Indeed,  a  few  years  down  the  line,
concerns  are  emerging  over  the  relatively  limited
number  of  jobs  that  directly  accrue  from  these
investments”  (Batmanglich/Enria  2014:  14).  It  is
estimated  that  Sierra  Leone’s  unemployment  rate
still  lingers  at  about  60  or  70  percent.22 These
ActionAid (2013: 10), HRW (2014: 31-34).
20 For a description of the traditional gendered division of labor
and gendered purchasing responsibilities in rural Sierra Leo-
ne, see Coulter (2009: 66-72).
21 The company is a subsidiary of the SIVA Group and focuses 
on palm oil for ethanol production in Port Loko District.
22 These percentages are widely circulated and can, for exam-
percentages  are  shocking  and  also  somewhat
misleading.  They  clearly  include  large  numbers  of
people  who  are  self-employed  (as  traders,  home-
cooked  food  sellers,  hairdressers,  motorcycle-taxi
drivers, car-wash boys etc.) or who labor  on an on-‒
and-off  basis  at  least   without  receiving  any  or‒
without  receiving  regular  monetary  pay.  The
problem,  as  Sierra  Leoneans  often  put  it,  is  that  a
“real”  job  is  extremely  hard  to  get;  a  “real”  job
meaning  formal  employment  with  a  regular  und
sufficient salary, health benefits and, in consequence,
some degree of security (see also Batmanglich/Enria
2014).  While  some  companies,  especially  African
Minerals  and  London  Mining  (the  two  growth-
driving  iron  ore  companies),  offer  gainful
employment  opportunities  (often  including  health
benefits for employees and their families) for skilled
workers   for  example,  for  experienced  security‒
personnel23 and for those trained and able to operate
specific  machineries   daily  agricultural  labor  is‒
definitely not well-paid. For example, young women
and  men  working  as  agricultural  laborers  for  SAC
make no more than 10.000 Leones per day, not even
enough to  provide  one  decent  family  meal  per  day
(see Welthungerhilfe 2012: 27).
In many FDI-affected areas the expectation of gainful
employment  opportunities  has  also  attracted
strangers  from  other  parts  of  the  country  and,
especially  in  the  iron  ore  areas,  also  from
neighboring  Guinea,  who  compete  with  the  local
labor  force.  This  has  led  to  tensions  with,  and  to
frustration on the part of local people, who feel that
they  should  receive  preferential  employment-
treatment,  as  they  are  the  ones  immediately  (and
adversely)  affected  by  land  deals  (see
Welthungerhilfe 2012: 25-27). During my research in
Lunsar  (the  London  Mining  area)  in  February  and
March 2014, I often heard complaints that the “whole
town  is  full  of  Guinea  people”,  and  I  met  several
London Mining employees who were struggling with
Krio,  the Sierra Leonean lingua franca,  and instead
preferred French. An expat trainer and recruiter with
ple, be found on the Sierra Leone country information pages 
provided by the World Bank (2014d) and UNDP (2014).
23 During my research in Lunsar (the London Mining area) in 
February and March 2014, I stayed with ex-combatants who 
had found or were hoping to find employment with Dawnus, 
a multinational company providing logistical and security 
services for London Mining. According to them, Dawnus was
specifically looking to recruit ex-militaries with experience in
Iraq. Under the official heading of “Overseas Youth Employ-
ment” the deployment of ex-combatants (from the 1991-2002
civil war) to Iraq had been organized by the Sierra Leone go-
vernment in 2009. The Ministry of Labor chose and registe-
red recruits who were then taken up by a private security 
company (for details see Christensen 2013; 2014).
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London Mining explained to me that many Guinean
applicants had more advanced technical training and
experience as  operators  of  heavy machinery  and as
mechanics,  which  gave  them  an  advantage  over
Sierra  Leoneans  seeking  employment  with  the
company.  However,  I  am  not  aware  that  this
competition has led to any kind of generalized hatred
or  to  attacks  against  migrant  foreigners  or  Sierra
Leonean strangers,  neither in Lunsar nor anywhere
else in the country.
The  influx  of  strangers  and  foreigners  into  FDI-
affected  areas  has  also  generated  business
opportunities  for  receiving  communities:  Migrant
male  workers,  especially  when they  have money to
spend, tend to create new opportunities with regard
to  housing,  the  selling  of  cooked  food,  nighttime
entertainment  and sex-work (see also Welthunger-‒
hilfe  2012:  28).  At  the  same  time,  prostitutes  and
prostitution are usually regarded as grave social evils
in Sierra Leone.24 This  was a common topic during
my field research in Lunsar. Many people I spoke to,
men  in  particular,  lamented  the  lack  of  moral
conduct  and  consciousness  among  local  women
offering  themselves  in  the  newly  established  posh
night club, which was frequented by those who had
already found gainful employment and regarded with
envy by those who were still seeking it. The town was
bursting full with mostly male job-seekers who had
submitted  their  application  at  the  London  Mining
office and were waiting and hoping to be called for an
interview.25 I  also  discussed  prostitution  and  its
moral implications with a woman in her late thirties
24 Many people differentiate between prostitution, which does 
not seek to hide its purely commercial character, and a speci-
fic type of “boyfriend-girlfriend”-relationship that basically 
amounts to an exchange of sex and money but also contains 
some elements of a more legitimate relationship; “boyfriend-
girlfriend” arrangements are usually somewhat steady and the
woman will likely also perform other “wifely” duties, such as
cooking and washing for her man etc. This latter type of ar-
rangement is fairly common and more accepted (see also 
Coulter 2009: 199-205).
25 I never encountered any Western (or, more precisely, reco-
gnizably Western or “white”) expat workers anywhere in 
Lunsar; it seemed that they only moved around in Land Crui-
sers and hardly interacted with the local population. This im-
pression was confirmed by two London Mining expat em-
ployees. They explained that London Mining encouraged its 
expat employees to stay in their guarded quarters, though 
“some guys mess around with local girls” (conversations in 
February 2014). It may be that the city Makeni, a one hour 
drive from Lunsar, is the place to do just that. A recent blog 
post by a London School of Economics student who recently 
spent three months in Sierra Leone states that, “[a]nyone who
has been to a major town in Sierra Leone called Makeni 
knows that white British miners sleep with under-age and 
vulnerable prostitutes” (Mosselmans 2014).
who ran a small cookery shop where she sold cheap
meals  and  marihuana  and,  at  night,  sheltered
homeless “street children”; most of them were male
teenagers,  but among them were also a few “lower-
level”  prostitutes  catering  to  less  affluent  clients
whom they found in the streets.  This  cookery shop
owner called the moral outrage over prostitution and
the  stigmatization  of  prostitutes  an  immense
hypocrisy.  After all,  she pointed out,  it  is  men who
frequent prostitutes. She herself had come to Lunsar
from a nearby village, which had been relocated due
to the mining operations.26 She told me that she had
much empathy with local women and girls who left
their  husbands  or  parents  and  came  to  Lunsar  to
“hustle” instead of staying in the villages where they
had  no  prospects  for  a  better  life;  in  the  bustling
town one could at least hope that some opportunity
might present itself one day (conversation in Lunsar,
February  2014).  The  impact  on  family  stability  in
affected  areas  is  also  noted  in  the  Welthungerhilfe
report  on  the  SAC  investment  in  Pujehun  District:
“Staff from the Welthungerhilfe project observed that
some  women  left  their  husbands  because  the  men
had  lost  their  fields  and  thus  their  source  of
livelihood. Usually the women return to their family
of  descent  to  get  land  for  crop  cultivation.
Welthungerhilfe project staff called this phenomenon
‘semi-divorce’.  Some  men  in  the  villages  were
worried  that  their  wives  would leave them because
other  men working in  the plantation earned more”
(Welthungerhilfe 2012: 30).
It  is  worth noting that  such concerns pertaining to
female  conduct  are  certainly  not  new  or
unprecedented. Rather, they are a recurrent theme in
Sierra  Leone   especially  in  times  of  crisis  and‒
change. For example, David Rosen describes similar
concerns  based  on  his  research  in  1970s  Kono
District, where local women tried to rid themselves of
the restrictions that their families and especially their
husbands  placed  upon  them.  Their  aim  was  to
concentrate  on  doing  business  in  order  to  benefit
from  the  cash-availability  in  Kono,  Sierra  Leone’s
main  diamond  mining  area,  due  to  its  large  and
growing  population  of  (male)  migrant  miners.27
Rosen  describes  that,  “[m]ale  fears  about  female
involvement in marketing focus upon the degree to
which  this  involvement  conflicts  with,  or
undermines, the household. Men attach great stigma
to marketing and sometimes see it as tantamount to
prostitution”  (Rosen 1981:  158).  Based on research
during  and  immediately  after  the  civil  war,  Susan
26 On relocation in mining areas, see e.g. Network Movement 
for Justice and Development (2010); HRW (2014).
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Shepler describes that female (ex-)combatants were
sometimes  even  more  stigmatized  than  their  male
counterparts,  due  to  a  moral  discourse  on  female
sexuality that branded female (ex-)fighters as spoiled
goods:  “Though,  in  practice,  they  often  had  very
similar  situations   they  [female  fighters]  were‒
abducted just as the boys were  there is some degree‒
to which sexual activity, even rape, is perceived to be
their own fault,  or at least something which cannot
easily  be  undone”  (Shepler  2002:  11).  The  concern
was  that  these  women  and  girls  who  had  been
exposed  to  a  lot  of  (forced)  sex  would  not  be
controllable  for  peace-time  husbands  (see  also
Coulter 2009).
But  their  recurrent  character  certainly  does  not
render such concerns inconsequential. They are likely
to  further  increase  jealousy-inspired  “disciplinary”
violence  against  women  and  girls  in  Sierra  Leone.
Husbands  and  also  steady  boyfriends  are  usually
expected to have the right and even the responsibility
to discipline their women to keep them in order. In
my  experience,  this  type  of  violence  is  still  widely
regarded as understandable and legitimate in Sierra
Leone  by men and also by many women (see also‒
UN Population Fund 2005). Women often interpret
the beatings they receive from their men as a “sign of
love”,  “if  he  doesn’t  beat  me,  he  doesn’t  love  me”
(conversation with a female university student in Bo
Town,  January  2009).  However,  women  are  often
unwilling  to  submissively  suffer  the  beatings  of  a
husband  or  boyfriend  who  is  no  longer  able  to
provide  for  them.  In  this  case,  they  are  likely  to
prefer separation (or “semi-divorce”, as described by
Welthungerhilfe  staff)  in  order  to  look  for  other
27 From the 1950s on Kono experienced a diamond rush that 
was largely driven by the comparatively easy accessibility of 
diamonds in Kono’s alluvial diamond fields: “Unlike South 
Africa, where diamond mining is associated with the me-
chanical mining of deep reserves, in Sierra Leone it is not un-
common to find a good quality diamond on the ground sur-
face, particularly after rain” (Maconachie/Binns 2007: 370). 
Many of those migrating to Kono engaged in manual labor il-
licit mining (that is, mining without a formally attained go-
vernment license): “In the early 1970s, diamond mining acti-
vities could be broadly divided into three types. First, the Na-
tional Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) had the exclusive
right to mine in two lease areas at Yengema (Kono District) 
and Tongo Field (Kenema District). Elsewhere, indigenous 
Sierra Leoneans could apply for mining licences under the 
Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS), created in 1955.
A third type of mining activity was ‘illicit mining’, where in-
dividuals and groups mined illegally in the company lease 
areas, or undertook unlicensed mining in ADMS designated 
areas” (Maconachie/Binns 2007: 371; on the political econo-
my of diamond miming in pre-war Sierra Leone, see Reno 
1995).  During my field researches in 2009, 2013, and 2014, 
I often heard that it has become difficult to find alluvial dia-
monds; the deposits appear to be close to exhausted.
livelihood and survival options. 
5. CONFLICTS AND SECURITY 
CONCERNS
Major sources of open conflict, which has been com-
paratively more prevalent in mining than in agribusi-
ness areas,  are the working conditions provided by
foreign companies as well as bans that have been im-
posed  on  local  employees  joining  a  union  of  their
choice or forming new unions (see Welthungerhilfe
2012: 27-28; Medico International et al. 2013; HRW
48-45). Complaints about working conditions mostly
pertain to payment, workers’ physical security on the
job (with regard to accidents), lack of due process in
job  dismissals,  and  racist  mistreatment  by  expat
staff.  A  particularly  conflict-intensive  relationship
between expat staff and workers exists in the context
of a comparatively older investment in industrial dia-
mond  mining  in  Kono  District.  Koidu  Holdings,
which was renamed OCTÉA in 2011 and which is now
fully  owned  by  the  Geneva-based  Barry  Steinmetz
Group,  has  been  operating  in  Sierra  Leone  since
shortly after the end of the civil war (see Gberie 2010:
10). Its origins can be traced back even further, to a
deal between the war time military government (Na-
tional  Provisional  Ruling  Council,  1992-1996)  and
the South African private military company Executi-
ve Outcomes, which received mining concessions in
lieu of monetary payment for its support in fighting
the government-opposed Revolutionary United Front
(see McIntyre/Weiss  2007: 72-74).  During research
in the Kono District  capital  town Koidu in October
2013, I met several current and former OCTÉA em-
ployees who fully agreed that the company had been
mistreating  them:  the  salaries  were  low,  between
300.000  to  400.000  Leones  per  months  (roughly
around 60 EUR) for an “unskilled” worker, and even
workers operating heavy machinery were considered
“unskilled”; the work was dangerous and unhealthy,
and there was no proper health/accident insurance;
any small “mistake” during operations (such as a mi-
nor scratch on a machine) was punished by money
being taken out of the worker’s salary; the lunch pro-
vided by the company was of low quality; and South
African expat staff regularly used abusive and racist
language when dealing with workers (interviews and
conversations in Koidu, October 2013). But the wor-
kers were even more outraged about local and natio-
nal politicians’ and traditional authorities’ corrupt in-
volvements  with the company.  During a discussion
with traders, laid off mining workers, and a local pas-
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tor, they pointed out that one paramount chief in Ko-
idu had openly declared  in a radio interview no less‒
 that he regularly received “an envelope” (a bribe)‒
from Koidu Holdings/OCTÉA. According to their ac-
count,  the paramount chief went on to explain that
he saw no reason to be ashamed. After all, he was a
man with many responsibilities  and he claimed to‒
know for a fact that even the Vice President (a Kono
“son of the soil”) received his envelopes on a regular
basis. My discussion partners stressed that, in conse-
quence, it was hardly surprising that local and natio-
nal authorities  had been failing to protect  the inte-
rests of Koidu Holdings/OCTÉA employees, who had
repeatedly  tried  to  draw  attention  to  their  various
grievances:  “The  people  [Koidu  Holdings/OCTÉA
management] openly tell us that our government is
in their pockets…the police takes its share, the milita-
ry takes its share, the local government officials take
their own…so who can talk for us? This is our situati-
on.  It  is  so  appalling.  Because  those  people  who
should talk for us have already taken the side of the
company”  (interview  with  laid  off  workers/former
strike leaders in Koidu, October 2013). 
Following  initially  peaceful  protests,  a  strike
organized  by  Koidu  Holdings/OCTÉA  workers  in
December 2012 escalated into what became termed a
“riot” and was dissolved by a police intervention that
left many wounded and two people dead by gunshots.
There are conflicting accounts  on the course of the
escalation.  Whereas  the  police  version  describes
thoroughly  professional  conduct  on the  side  of  the
intervening  OSD  paramilitary  police  forces  (see
Awareness  Times  2013),  the  former  strike  leaders
assert  that  the  “riot”  only  started  with  the
involvement of  police forces that  took advantage of
the general confusion and went on a looting spree, in
which they were then joined by random opportunists.
While  the  strike  was  unanimously  condemned  by
government officials, neither the workers’ grievances
nor the inflicted wounds and fatalities were found to
be  worthy  of  an  official  statement.  Rather,  the
reaction  suggested  that  any  protest  against  foreign
investors’  business  practices  must  be  regarded  as
unlawful.  Even  before  the  escalation,  the  strikers
experienced that Vice President Sam Suamana – who
had  come  to  Koidu  on  a  mediation  mission  –
addressed them without regard for their grievances:
“Rather  than  addressing  the  root  causes,  the  Vice
President  blanketly  blamed the protesters  for  what
he referred to as taking the law into their hands and
therefore ordered all present at a meeting summoned
to  address  the  aggrieved  workers  and  community
residents  to  sit  down  on  the  ground  as  a  way  of
demonstrating his  anger at them for disrupting the
operations of the company” (Medico International et
al. 2013: 1). From the outset, the strikers were treated
as riotous troublemakers.
Contrary to what one might expect, FDI inflows into
Sierra  Leone  have  not  triggered  a  proliferation  of
heavily armed private security companies catering to
the security and protection needs and/or desires of
foreign  companies.  Though  foreign  companies
certainly  do  employ  their  own  private  security
personnel, it appears that they have to rely on Sierra
Leonean police forces whenever they require  armed
services; their own private security personnel remain
unarmed.  In  an  interview  with  HRW,  Police
Inspector  General  Francis  Munu stated,  “that  there
are informal guidelines for how companies  can pay
the police for specific functions, but no national laws
govern the payment of police by private firms” (HRW
2014:  57).  An  officer  of  the  OSD,  a  paramilitary
police division,  explained to me in more detail  that
any type of armed private security was not welcome
in Sierra Leone, as it would “undermine the state”; if
private  persons  or  companies  required  armed
services,  they  would  have  to  subcontract  OSD
personnel  (informal  conversation  in  Kenema,
February 2014). The officer providing this statement
was himself employed to guard the private residence
of the prospective investors planning to do business
(set up a rubber plantation) in rural Bo District (see
section 2.). Only a few days later I met another OSD
officer  who  was  guarding  a  small  diamond  mining
site  (also  in  rural  Bo  District)  that  was  run  by  an
Australian  entrepreneur.  I  approached  this  OSD
officer, who was staying in a makeshift shed near the
mining site,  and asked him to explain his  terms of
engagement to  me. Why was he guarding a private
mining  site?  Was  he  not  a  regular  police  officer
employed  by the state?  He answered  that  this  was
indeed  the  case  but  that,  in  Sierra  Leone,  the
government  was  also  taking  care  of  private  people
(informal conversation in rural Bo District, February
2014).
From several more conversations with OSD officers
and foreign company employees in different parts of
the  country  (October  2013  and  February-March
2014)  emerged the following picture:  It  seems that
OSD personnel can be hired for a fixed charge, which
flows directly back to police headquarters and/or to
some government department (this was a matter of
speculation),  while  the  subcontracted  officers  only
receive  their  regular  monthly  salary  plus  optional
bonuses from the respective client. In short, it seems
that  the  police-leadership  and/or  whoever  is  in
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charge  of  the  process  have  effectively  monopolized
the armed private security business in Sierra Leone
by public means. 
Though  it  does  indeed  appear  preferable  to  a
proliferation of  armed private  security  providers  in
many  respects,  this  type  of  public-private
arrangement comes with the consequence that state
police  forces   ‒ especially  the  OSD   ‒ have  been
directly  involved  in  violence  against  protesting
workers, sympathizers, and bystanders; most notably
in Koidu in 2007 and 2012 (Network Movement for
Justice and Development 2010; Medico International
2013)  and  in  Bumbuna,  a  town  in  the  African
Minerals Limited iron ore mining area, in 2012 (see
HRW 2014).  The latter  “incident”,  which led to the
confirmed death of a female protester (she was part
of a group of women who wanted to set a sign to stop
violent clashes and police harassments that had been
going  on  for  two  days,  see  HRW  2014:  54-55),  is
documented in a recent HRW report, which has been
rejected as unfounded by government officials.28 One
female market seller told HRW: “Police came inside
the town’s central market and told everyone to pack
and leave. We didn’t know why. They set tear gas to
disperse the market. I was here, and the gas hurt my
eyes. At first I refused to leave. If you look, you can
see holes  in the ceiling from where the police  shot
[bullet  holes  still  visible].  We  then  had  to  leave
because  of  the  tear  gas,  and  we  couldn’t  take  our
things.  We lost our produce,  and our earnings, and
we ran home to our houses. The police shot outside
our houses to intimidate us” (HRW 2014: 52). 
For many affected people in Sierra Leone, the OSD’s
involvement  confirms  that  “their  own”  authorities
are not on their side but rather on the side of foreign
investors   ‒ or,  as the authorities  themselves  would
have it, on the side of development. “Development”,
in this context, implies less a path towards individual
and  collective  betterment  but  rather  a  disciplinary
concept  that  serves  to  denounce  many  people’s
livelihoods,  their  (involuntary)  standards  of  non-
education  (in  terms  of  formal  schooling),  and
grievances  as  backwards,  objectionable,  und
28 The HRW report confirms findings by the Human Rights 
Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL), an independent hu-
man rights institution created by an act of parliament in 2004.
The Commission published its assessment of the Bumbuna 
“incident” in 2012, stating that, “The events of the 16th to 
18th April 2012 in Bumbuna were a stark reminder that peace
cannot be taken for granted. People had to flee their homes in
search of safety while others had to endure the pain of bodily 
injuries. Others suffered fear that these events were a sign 
that the old dark days of the war can return at any time. Peo-
ple lost property and had their homes vandalized” (HRCSL 
2012: v). 
ultimately as harmful to the countries development
prospects   ‒ without offering them a way out. At the
same  time,  the  so  denounced  are  confronted  with
public  education campaigns  urging them to change
their  ways  and  become  useful  and  employable
citizens. For example, during a workshop held by the
Attitudinal  and  Behavioral  Change  Secretariat  (a
government  agency)  in 2013,  its  executive  director,
“called for a standard transformation in the attitude
of  the  youth  by  transforming  themselves  and
cultivating a culture of hard work, commitment and
devotion to self-improvement and motivation: ‘If you
do not work towards prosperity you will not achieve
it,  there is  dignity in labour  and one should expect
after  labour,  we  should  have  positive  attitude  and
strive for excellence to acquire the required skills that
will  make  you  useful  and  employable,’  he  said”
(Bangura 2013).  And National Youth Commissioner
Anthony  Koroma  added,  “The  youth  must  be
prepared  to  learn  as  there  is  no  alternative  to
education.  They  should  focus  their  attitude  on
achieving  the  ‘Agenda for  Prosperity’  [the  title  and
motto  of  the  current  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy
Paper] and help the president achieve his dreams of
making Sierra Leone a middle level income nation by
2035”  (Bangura  2013).  Given  the  condition  of  the
education system, the lack of job opportunities, and
the frustrating hardships of everyday life and survival
in  Sierra  Leone,  one  is  left  to  wonder  how  Sierra
Leoneans are to achieve such self-optimization.
In  terms  of  security,  “development”  furthermore
implies  that  those  who  do  not  live  up  to  its
imperatives and standards cannot necessarily count
on  the  state’s  protection  −  especially  when  they
express discontent. Ironically, establishing capacities
to defend a development-oriented state was exactly
the rationale behind reforming, training, and arming
the OSD over the course of the largely DFID-led and
financed security sector reforms of the late 1990s and
early  2000s  (see  Krogstadt  2012:  274-278).  As
Erlend Grøner Krogstadt puts it in his analysis of the
intertwined  development  and  security  logics  that
inspired the security sector reform processes, “At the
base  of  this  assemblage  is  a  conflicted  notion  of
statehood  in  which  force  is  simultaneously  the
problem and the solution – what stifles development,
but also what enables it” (Krogstadt 2012: 278). The
problematic  side  has  already  become  apparent,  at
least  if  one  understands  development  as  also
encompassing  protest  and  resistance  against
practices  that  are  immediately  experienced  as
harmful and exploitative and as not contributing to
betterment. 
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6. CONCLUSION
In spite of high hopes it remains far from certain that
FDI  especially in its current form and given the lack‒
of binding and effective protective measures for local
people  and  communities   will  eventually  deliver‒
overall net development benefits to most Sierra Leo-
neans. What has already become apparent, however,
is that the immediately felt impacts of FDI and rela-
ted large-scale land deals often not only constitute no
tangible improvement  but  have made everyday live
and survival  even more difficult  for  affected people
and  communities.  In  consequence,  “development”
has often been a disappointing experience in Sierra
Leone. 
Taking this  disappointment  seriously  does  not only
offer  a  disconcerting  perspective  into  the
uncertainties  and  ambiguities  of  FDI-driven
“development”  in  Sierra  Leone;  it  can  also  help  to
make sense of  the mistrust  and alienation that  has
become painfully apparent during the current Ebola
epidemic  (see  also  Menzel  2014).  By  now,  anyone
following the Western media coverage on Ebola has
heard  of  Sierra  Leoneans’  alienation  from  their
authorities and the mistrust that has also extended to
Western health workers. Both have too often (though
certainly  not  exclusively,  see  e.g.  Mogelson  2015)
been depicted  via  the  trope  of  the  “ignorant  local”
who does not adopt “sensible” measures to prevent
infection  and  may  not  even  believe  that  Ebola  “is
real”. However, as Susan Shepler, an anthropologist
with  long  experience  in  Sierra  Leone,  recently
pointed out: “People’s apprehensions […] come from
experience, not from ignorance” (Shepler 2014). And
experience has taught  Sierra Leoneans not to  place
blind trust into measures and programs that national
and local  authorities  as well  as international actors
promote as putting them on the road to betterment. 
Still, while I am writing this conclusion, it looks as if
Sierra  Leoneans  are  finding  ways  to  fight  the
epidemic:  complying  with  Ebola  emergency  laws
when  they  can;  trusting  their  authorities  and
international missions, NGOs, and agencies as much
as they deem reasonable and practicable; making use
of  offered  services  where  and  when  they  are
available;  and struggling  with  food  shortages,  fear,
loss,  and  not  least  “normal”  sicknesses  (Typhoid,
Malaria etc.) while still holding on to hopes for better
times.29 President  Koroma  certainly  delivered  an
adequate description during his speech at the 2009
London  Trade  and  Investment  Forum,  when  he
claimed that, “We are a people of limited means but
of unlimited ambition. It is time to join us in fulfilling
that  ambition.  It  is  time  to  think  differently  about
Sierra Leone.” (Koroma 2009) 
29 For some hopeful perspectives see the blog by Susan Shepler 
and Nina Yamanis on their recent field research in Freetown 
(Shepler/Yamanis 2015).
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